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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
-v-

RONALD LEMOYNE KELLY,

Case No.

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Ronald Lemoyne Kelly, apoeals from his conviction for the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First
Degree, a Capital Offense, in violation of Utah Code Annotated
§76-5-202 (1) (d) (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Appellant was charged by Information with one count of
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a Caoital Offense,
with certain multiple alleged aggravating circumstances.

At the

Preliminary Examination held on April 5 and 6 of 1982, all but
two aggravating circumstances were dismissed.

The two aggravating

circumstances not dismissed, but bound over, were that the killing

took place, "while the actor was engaged in the commission of, or
attempting to commit rape and/or aggravated sexual assault."

On May 5, 1983, after approximately four weeks of trial,
the court found Mr. Kelly guilty of the Criminal Homicide, :iunie
in the First Degree, and imoosed the sentence of life

imprison~er

due to the court's finding that the death Penalty was not annropriate under the circumstances of this case.

The Defendant, t!r.

Kelly, was sentenced to life imprisonment and committed forthwitr.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of guilt
rendered by the trial court at the guilt phase of the trial to the
offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a
Capital Offense, and a dismissal of the charge.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Appellant/Defendant, Ronald Lemoyne Kelly, was out in
the evening hours of February 9, 1982, with friends at several
locations.

At approximately 1:30 a.m. of Februarv 10, 1982, Mr.

Kelly met up with four individuals outside of the Caladonia Apartments located on the northwest corner of Sixth South and Fifth
East, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Mr. Kelly requested these friends,

among them a native Venezuelan nick-named "Tido," to accomoany
Mr. Kelly to the apartment house located at 605 South 500 East in
order for Mr. Kelly to use the telephone in one of the apartments
located there belonging to a Darla Cates, a close nersonal friend
of Mr. Kelly's.

All of the friends declined to accompany Mr.

Kelly and they parted company with Mr. Kelly at that time.

-2-

At approximately 3:30 a.m., Februarv 10, 1982, two peonle
living directly below the deceased, Carla Taylor, heard what they
believed to be a scream and some other noises emitting from the
1partment of the victim, Carla Taylor.

All was quiet when they

heard footsteps descendin? the common area stairs from the apartments upstairs and the door to the outside front porch open and
shut.

These two people, Elizabeth Langford and Clark Campbell

testified that they peeked out of their front room window that
was covered with two sets of curtains to see a man, dark in
coloration, wearing a dark ski partk and gloves.

Their

vision was somewhat limited due to the nature of their observation and the fact that the light which normally lightens the
porch area of the converted old home was not on.
Even though Mr. Campbell did not want to get involved in
a believed dispute between a boyfriend and the victim,

~<s.

Langford finally prevailed on him to put on his tennis shoes and
go across the street to call the police, anonymously, from a
public pay phone.
Officer Frank Hatton-ward of the Salt Lake Police Denartment was dispatched to the address of 605 South 500 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah, and proceeded into the apartment building, uo
the common stairway and knocked on the door of the one of two
upstair apartment doors belonging to the victim, Carla Taylor.
Receiving no answer to the officer's request for entry he tried
the door and found it to be unlocked.

As the officer opened the

door to the victim's apartment all lights were off inside and so
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with the aid of a flashlight, the officer illuITJinated the inside
of the apartment and observed the body of the victim in the front
living room portion of the apartment.

Officer Hatton-ward deter-

mined that the victim was dead and had a 14-inch kitchen-tvne
knife in her chest anu a toothbrush inserted in her vagina,

1,7hic~

was exposed.
After a quick search of the aoartITJent, the officer found
three possible entrances into the apartment; the front door by
which he hau entered, which was unlocked, a bacl: door leading to
a rear parking area that was partiallv open but secured with a
chair, and a doorway leading from the victim's anartment to the
apartment of Darla Cates who lived with a black ITJan bv the name
of Jerome Thorton.
The officer located the two witnesses, Ms. Langford, and
Mr. Campbell, and afLer learning that the man they saw had left
on foot, the officer searched only the front portion of the apartment house and found what they believed to be footprints leaving
the apartment house.

Apparently the officer was never told that

in Mr. Campbell's unsuccessful attempt at aiding the victim, he
too had left the apartment house and transversed the street wearing tennis shoes to call the police.
The prints the police chose to follow, although intermittent, lead them to the apartment house of the Apnellant, Mr.
Kelly, (T. 201) and upon demanding entry, Mr. Kelly, clothed onlv
in his underwear was confronted with no less than three uniformed
police officers who immediately began to ask his whereabouts on
the morning in question.
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Detective Farnsworth of the Salt Lake Police Deoartment
was the first to enter the Appellant's home with Mr. Kelly still
standing in his underwear.

Prior to any Miranda warning,

Tlclective Farnsworth demended to know if Mr. Kelly had "killed
1:c·:one tonight," or "knifed anyone tonight."

Mr. Kelly res-

ponded, "Are you serious?" (T. 209).
Detective Farnsworth, who had followed some intermittent
orints in the snow to the Appellant's residence had received two
conflicting descriptions of a suspect.

The first description

was of a black male adult, wearing a black or navy coat with a
red stripe.

The second description was of a white male adult,

wearing the same coat as described above.

It was this second

description which Detective Farnsworth was working with when
he stood on the porch of the Appellant's home and confronted
the Appellant, a black man in his undershorts.
As he entered the Aopellant's residence, Officer Farnsworth observed a ski oarka on the couch, royal blue in color
with beige shoulders and a red stripe in a v-shaped pattern
!T.198).

Officer Farnsworth again told Mr. Kelly that he was

investigating a homicide and that he had followed a set of footprints to his house.

He asked Mr. Kelly is he had been out dur-

ing the night and what shoes had he been wearin>;.

The Defendant

went to the bedroom, followed bv the officer (T.195), and a oair
of shoes was seen by the officer.
shoes without a warrant (T.199).
dant's residence at this time.

Officer Farnsworth seized the
Officer Bernard entered the Defen-

He did not request oermission to

enter nor was any permission given by Mr. Kelly.
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Officer Martin came

into the residence without requesting permission to enter either
Officer Farnsworth then read the Defendant hi~ 'liranda rights.
Defendant said he was familiar with the ~<iranda rights.

Office'

Farnsworth asked him if he wished to answer any questions and
the Defendant said, "I don't know."

Officer Farnsworth told

him that was not the right answer (T. 176) and said "Do you
want to answer questions or don't you?"
"Well, I don't know, it depends"
said, "Well let me ask you again.
homicide, a murder.

The Defendant reolied,

(PHT 115).

Officer Farnsworth

We are investigating a

It is a serious offense.

He followed some

footprints here and you have shown me some shoes and those were
the same footprints I have been following.
house tonight

0

"

Were you at the

The Defendant did not answer that question.

Then Officer Farnsworth asked the Defendant what clothes he was
wearing.

The Defendant indicated a black shirt, black pants,

and two pairs of socks.

The officer seized all these clothes

and informed the Defendant that he would have to come with him
to speak to detectives in regards to the homicide (T. 180).
Sargent Martin and Captain Bernard then checked the apartment
"for other pesons."

Sargent Martin found a pair of gloves on

the bathroom floor.

He asked the Defendant i f he had worn them

that night and the Defendant said he had.

The gloves were

seized and the coat in the front room was also seized.

At approx·

imately 4:31 a.m. the Defendant was put in the back of a police
car.

Officer Bernard stayed at Mr. Kelly's residence "securing

it and showed the video technician, Hr. Cowley, what needed to
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be taped."
r1-10

At 6:50 a.m. the front room was taned, as well as the

purses.

Detective Abbot was contacted at 6: 50 a .m. also, and

cissigned to secure a search warrant for 637 Brixten Court.
',·.1arrant was served at 9:30 a.m.

A search

The return of that warrant con-

taining a list of what property was seized is attached hereto.
(See Appendix A.)
At the trial of this matter, Officer Fransworth testified
that the Defendant did not give consent to search his residence or
to seize any of his pronerty.

Ronald Kelly remained in various

police cars from 4: 30 a .m. until he was later taken to the !1etrooolitan Hall of Justice to be interrogated.

Before that inter-

rogation the Defendant was asked a number of questions by police
officers while in police cars.

Upon arriving at the Metropolitan

Hall of Justice he was interrogated by Detective Chanman from 5:25
a.m. to 7:55 a.m.
tran~cribed

This interrogation was recorded and has been

by the police department.

During this interview with Detective Chapman, Appellant
stated that he did indeed go over to the anartment comnlex located
at 605 South 500 East.

Appellant went on to state that he went

upstairs to request of Darla's boyfriend, Jerome Thorton, the use
of the phone to call a taxi cab to take him home due to the stormy
weather.

The Appellant went on to explain that when he got to the

front door,

and rang the bell, Jerome Thornton never came to the

door.

left down the stairs, paused at the front porch area

He

to zip up his coat and put his gloves on and then walked home.
It was later determined that the auartment of Darla Cates
'>1as directly across from the victim's apartment and that they were
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attached by a common hallway used by all, but also bv a passageway that was only accessible bv the two apartments of Darla Cates
and the victim.

It was also determined that on the night of the

murder, Darla Cates had left and gone to Idaho and Jerome Thort<q
was living alone in the adjoining apartment of the victim, Carlo
Taylor.

The only way to lock the connecting door between these

two apartments was from inside Jerome Thorton's apartment.

The

door on the victim's apartment oreviously had been broken bv the
victim when she left her kevs inside her apartment (T.223, 224).
The victim died of multiple stab wounds to the chest
(T. 339).

Three hairs were found on the right buttocks of the

victim, one of which was determined to be negroid oubic hair
having characteristice similar to those hairs taken from the
pubic region of the Appellant (T.558).

Testimony showed that

Appellant, prior to February 10, 1982, had been in the victim's
apartment.

The black man living across the hall had also been

in the victim's apartment prior to February 10 (T.151, 152).
The Appellant was arrested at his home in the early
morning hours of February 10, 1982, and brought to jail after a
lengthy interrogation period.

He was charged with First Degree

Murder and was subsequently convicted of this offense, and from
this conviction he now takes this aopeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE
DEFENDANT WHEN THE POLICE ENTERED HIS RESIDENCE
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ,
DEFENDANT'S SHOES WERE EVIDENCE OF A CRIME,
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)10 LEGAL RIGHT TO FOLLOW THE DEFENDANT TO HIS BEDR0011 AND THE SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT'S
SHOES AND OTHER CLOTHING HAS ILLEGAL.
Hithout probable cause to arrest the Appellant, Detective
Fdrnsworth had no legal right to follow the Apnellant to his bedroom.

The Appellant had consented to Officer Farnsworth's entry

into his front room, he did not consent to the officer's following
him to his bedroom (T. 195).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that

mere acquiesence to perceived police authority will not support a
search based on consent regardless of lack of overt coercion.
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 88 S.Ct.
1788 (1968).

Even if Officer Farnsworth had had a right to be in

the Appellant's bedroom and therefore had a legal plain view of
these shoes, a plain view seizure is limited to items that are
clearly incriminating.
(8th Cir. 1978).

United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 749

The law requires a nexus between an item to be

seized and criminal behavior and the orobable cause necessary to
seize a particular item must be examined in terms of "cause to
believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehensionorconviction."

Wardenv. Hayden, 387U.S. 294, 307, 181.

Ed.2d. 782, 793, 87 S.Ct. 1642 (1967).

Coolidge v. !fow Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 446, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971),
required that the incriminating nature of articles seized must be
irrnnediately apparent.
The shoes taken from the Appellant's bedroom were not
obviously contraband or weapons.

Their connection with the homi-

cide Officer Farnsworth was investigating was based solely on the

-9-

Appellant's pre-Miranda admission that he had been wearing them
that night.

Blood was not observed on the shoes until well after

they had been seized.

The Pattern on the bottom was not observe~

until after they had been seized.
Thus, without rrobable cause to arrest the Annellant,
these shoes were illegally observed and illegally

seized.

In

addition, if the seizure of the shoes is found to be illegal, the·
cannot become the basis for orobable cause necessarv to arrest the
Appellant and seize other items of his clothing (his pants and
gloves) under the

~:·uit

of the noisonous tree doctrine.

l·Jong Sun

v, United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963\
POINT II
WHETHER OR NOT THE POLICE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE
CAUSE TO .-\RREST RONALD KELLY, THE APPELLANT WAS
SUBJECTED TO A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION FROM THE
TI~~ THE POLICE OBSERVED HIM AND ENTERED HIS
RESIDENCE, AND ANY STATEMENTS HE MADE PRIOR TO
BEING INFORMED OF HIS MIR.At'IDA RIGHTS MUST BE
SUPPRESSED.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 16 L.Ed.2d 684, 706,

84 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), mandated that as a constitutional orerequisit.
to any questioning, an individual held for interrogation by a law
enforcement officer must be warned in clear and unequivocal terms
of his right to rel!lain silent.

In State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 216,

429 P.2d 969 (1967), the Utah Suoreme Court carried this farther
and held that when an accused is detained in any significant wav,
he may not be interrogated unless he is advised of the charges
against him.

The Court defined "an accused" as "the target of an

investigation."

"To fail to so warn one so being investigated is

-10-

to entrap him and to violate his constitutional privilege against
s~lf-incrimination.

A person cannot determine whether or not he

11ceeds counsel unless he was fully advised of the charges being
c:.msidered against him."

429 P.2d at 973.

Under the Miranda rule, the decisive state of custodial
interrogations is reached when there is questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custod;r or otherwise deprived of his freedol'l of action in any
significant way (T .195, 196).
Courts have expanded upon the objective definition of
custodial interrogation as cited above, and they have expressly
adopted the view that under the Miranda rule, a person is subjected to "custodial interrogation" not only if he is questioned
•.-1hen in custody or when deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way, but also if he is questioned when he reasonably
believes that he is so deprived.

People v. Arnold, 66 Cal.2d 438,

58 Cal.Rptr. 115, 426 P.2d 515 (1967); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119
(Utah 1983); People v. Hazel, 252 Cal.App.2d 412, 60 Cal.Rptr. 437
(1967); People v. Hhite, 69 Cal.2d 751, 72 Cal.Rptr. 873, 446 P.2d
993 (1968); People v. Ellingsen, 258 Cal.App.2d 535, 67 Cal.RPtr.
744 (1968); Myers v. State, 2 lid.App. 534, 240 A.2d 288 (1968);
People

V.

P.' 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 N.E.2d 255 (1967);

People v. Williams, 56 Misc.2d 837, 290 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1968).
The court in People v. Arnold, supra, while holding the
Miranda rules inapplicable because the trial had taken olace prior
to the Miranda decision, adopted the Miranda definition of "custodial
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interrogation."

The Court stated that "custodial interrogation"

occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of ac:
in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable ners.
that he is so deprived.

Applying that definition, the Court

heJ~

that the defendant might have reasonably believed that she had no
alternative but to comply with a deputy district attorney's author
itative summoning for interrogation at his office.

Similarly,

the defendant may reasonably have believed that if she would have
attempted to leave during the interrogation, she would have been
detained.

The Court, therefore, ruled statements made by the de fen·

dant on that occasion to be inadmissible.
In the case at bar, Mr. Kelly was summoned in the middle o'
the night to his door and informed by the nolice officer twice
that he was investigating a homicide and had followed footprints
from the scene of the crime to his house.

Knowing that no one

e~s;

was in his house, the defendant could reasonably conclude that he
was a suspect in a homicide investigation and as such was not free
to leave.

This reasonable belief was compounded by two more office:

entering, neither of whom asked permission but simnly walked into
his house (T. 196).
Interrogations of suspects at their own residences have bee'.
held to be "custodial interrogations" requiring Miranda warnings ar..
guidelines in several cases.
In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 22 L.Ed. 2d 311, 89 S.Ct
1095 (1969), the Court emphasized the absolute necessity for office·
interrogating people in custody to give the Miranda warnings.
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In

~·

supra,

the defendant had been interrogated in his own bed-

room by police officers.

Rejecting the argument that the Miranda

warnings were not applicable because the suspect had been interrogated in his own bedroom amidst familiar surroundings, the Court
stressed the fact that the suspect was not free to leave, and was
interrogated in the middle of the night.

The Miranda opinion

declared, the Court said, that the warnings were required where
the person being interrogated was in custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any way.
Similarly the Court in Rosario v. Guam, 391 F.2d 869 (9th
Cir. 1968), held that questioning by a civil connnissioner of a suspect in his own house was "custodial interrogation" and Miranda
applied.

In Rosario, supra, the Court found that the connnissioner

had acted in his official capacity as a peace officer.

The state

contended that the questioning had been merely incidental to a social
visit by the commissioner.

The Court stated that it is not necessary

for one to be handcuffed or even to be told that he is under arrest
to be in custody.

It is enough, the Court stated, that the susnect's

freedom of movement, at the time of questioning, is restricted in a
significant way by the presence of civil authority.
In State v. Anderson, 102 Ariz. 295, 428 P.2d 672 (1967) a
deputy sheriff's failure to give Miranda warnings before interrogating the defendant in her own home was held to be improper.

The

Court noted that the suspect would not have been free to leave
because "she was obviously the suspect of an apparent murder which
the sheriff's office was investigating."

The Court found the state-

ments inadmissible and remanded the case for a new trial.
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In People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 4~1
(1966), the Court applied the test of "custodial interrogation" t:
a situation where police officers questioned the defendant at an
apartment where the defendant was temporarily living with otherc
The police had reason to believe that the apartment was a base '
"illegal narcotic trade."

The Court stated that police question-

ing of a person, whereever detained, unon whom suspicion has
already focused, is ''custodial interrogation" under Miranda.

The

question was whether this was really a routine investigation or
aimed at eliciting a confession or admission.
Another case is particularly similar to the case at bar.
In Windsor v. United States, 389 F. 2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968), two F::
agents had obtained from the defendant's accomplice facts as to
a crime had

~een

committed and the defendant's involvement.

h~

The

agents questioned the defendant in his motel room shortly thereafter.

The FBI agents did not tell the defendant he was under

arrest or that he was a suspect.

At the conclusion of the

ing, the defendant waa placed under arrest.

questi~·

The Court found that

the focus of the investigation had clearly and unmistakably centert
upon the defendant, and that, in effect he had been in custodv or
deprived of his freedom in a significant way.

The statements made

by the defendant were suppressed because the principles of
Miranda "could not be so easily frustrated" by withholding from
the defendant the fact that he was a suspect.

There is no doubt

that the defendant in this case was the focus of the homicide
investigation.

The Miranda decision, Miranda v. United States,

supra, defined the focus test of Escobedo v.

Illinois,

378 U.S. -

l~

L Ed. 2d 977, 84 S .Ct. 1758 (1964), as "questioning initiated by

law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custoJy or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
·,i,;nificant way."

(Emphasis added.)

The question as to whether or not suspicion has focused on
rt

particular suspect can be a critical factor in determining

'.vhether an interrogation is custodial.
430, 473 P.2d 895

such a factor.

In State v. Largo, 24 Utah

(1970), the Utah Supreme Court found it to be

In that case, the issue was whether general

questioning of students by school officials as to the circumstances of an assault was custodial.

Holding that this interro-

gation was not custodial the Court stated, "There was no evidence
as to

~

specific accusations directed specifically toward one

Eerson . . . There was no evidence of focusing the inquiry on any
particular suspect, as in the Escobedo sense." t,73 P. 2d at 896.
(Emphasis added).
In the case at bar, Appellant was from the outset asked
the highly incriminating question, "Have you killed anyone tonight?"
indicating clearly that the focus of this homicide investigation
was centered on Appellant.
Another factor in determining whether or not an interrogation is custodial is whether or not the police at the time of the
questioning have probable cause to arrest.
Ariz. 566, 570 P.2d 508 (1977).

State v. Kennedy, 166

The quantum of information which

constitutes probable cause to arrest was defined in iiong Sun v.
United States, supra, as "the amount of evidence which would warrant
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a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a felony has been
conuni tted by the person to be arrested" (quoting Carro 11 v. Unite:
~'

267 U.S. 132, 162, 691 L.Ed. 543, 555, 45 S.Ct. 280 (19~j
Several cases have dealt with footprints in the snow as ,

basis for probable cause.

State v. Meunier, 137 Vt. 586, 409 A.

583 (1979), concerned a single track of footprints leading from t~
scene of a crime to a garage.

The Court found that this evidence

was probable cause that the Derson responsible for the crime had
fled into the garage.

(The police, however, did not go into the

garage but rather into one of three apartments with access to the
garage and their entry was deemed illegal.)
State, 383 N .Ed. 2d 282 (Ind. 1978)

See also Soears v.

(fact that there was only one

set of footprints in the snow leading away from the scene of a
crime and prints led to house where defendant was residing provided probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.)
Whether or not this Court finds that the officers in this
case had

probable cause to arrest the Appellant and irrespective

of what point in time this quantum of evidence was nresent or not
present, it is the position of the defense that Mr. Kelly was subject to custodial interrogation from the time Officer Farnsworth firs
entered his residence, since probable cause to arrest is only one
fact in determining whether an interrogation is custodial.
Would Officer Farnsworth have gone away if the Appellant
had refused him entrance to the residence or would all the officers
have left the premises at any point if the Defendant had asked ther
to?

Certainly not (T. 198-199).

These officers had "found their

man" and their purpose was to get him to confess his guilt desnitc
his constitutional right not to do so.
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The officers' further purpose was to gather evidence from
the Appellant necessary to convict him.

From the time Officer

Farnsworth first entered the apartment until he read the Appellant
1is Miranda rights,

1

was exculpatory.

the only information he got from the Appellant

The Appellant, as he had a right to do, simply

did not answer some of the questions asked of him (E.G., "Have you
killed or assaulted anyone?")

(T. 209).

The only additional nosi-

tive evidence the officer obtained after his initial entry and
view of the Appellant and the mis-described ski parka on the couch
were the Appellant's shoes, and these shoes were not really additional evidence.

Even before his entry the officer had probable

cause that they would be in the house since the prints from them
appeared to enter the apartment by the only door.

Any additional

"evidence" coming from the Defendant not answering the officer's
questions or giving "unsatisfactory" answers was merely cumulative
and could not in itself establish probable cause.
POINT III
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE APPELLANT AFTER HE WAS
READ HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS MUST BE SUPPRESSED
BECAUSE THE APPELLANT NEVER WAIVED HIS MIRANDA
RIGHTS.
The waiver of Miranda rights as well as all other constitutional rights must be a knowing, intelligent waiver and the prosecutor has the burden of proving "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege."

Johnson v. Zerbst,

304 U.S. 458, at 464, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1933).

The

waiver, North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 60 L.Ed. 286, 99

S Ct. 1755 (1979), cannot be presumed from silence.
Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 475, 16 L.Ed. 2d at 724.
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Miranda v.
In Edwards v.

Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981)

~

69 L.Ed.2d 984, 101 S.Ct. 3128, the United States

~·(U.S.)

Supreme Court repeated the standard of waiver as a

·~nowing

and

intelligent relinquishment of a known right," and found that
this relinquishment would not be lightly inferred, at 391.
Mr. Kelly was asked if he wanted to relinquish his rights.
Specifically he was asked twice if he wanted to answer some
questions.

Twice he answered, "I don't know." (T. 208, 209).

He

was told by the police officer that his answer "was not the right
answer," (T. 209), whereu-pon with no further inquiry, the
officer proceded with his questioning ("Were you at the house
tonight?"

"What were you wearing?" [T. 209]).

stitute a valid waiver under any standard.

This did not con-

Just as a valid waiver

cannot be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after
warnings are given, it cannot be presumed simply from the fact
that a confession, or in this case statements, were in fact eventually obtained.

Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 475, 16

L.Ed.2d 724.
POINT IV
EVEN IF THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE
THAT THE APPELLANT HAD COMMITTED A CRIME AND
THAT HIS CLOTHING WAS EVIDENCE OF THAT CRIME,
THEY HAD NO RIGHT TO SEIZE THE CLOTHING (SHOES,
PANTS, AND GLOVES) WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT·
There was nothing about the Defendant's shoes, pants, and
gloves at the time they were seized by the police officers to
indicate that they were evidence of a crime.

Such evidence was

discovered only after the items were seized and insnected by the
officers.
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Warrantless Searches
The Supreme Court of the United States has time and again
held that police may not conduct a search unless they first procure
;; warrant from a neutral magistrate.
~·

389 U.S.

The Court in Katy v. United

347, 357, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967),

held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment subject

only to a few specifically-established

and well-delineated exceptions.

The Court places the burden on

the party seeking an exemption from the constitutional mandate to
prove the circumstances of the situation made the warrantless search
imperative.

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).

(The burden is on prosecution to justify search or seizure without
warrant, People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1142
1382 (1972).

~~rt.

den. 93 S.Ct.

The Court has continually stressed that these "excep-

tions" are few and are jealously and carefully drawn.

Steagald v.

United States, 451 U.S. 204, 68 L.Ed.2d 38, 101 S.Ct. 1642 (1981);
Arkansas v. Saunders, 442 U.S. 753, 759, 61 L.Ed.2d 235, 231, 99 S.
Ct. 2586 (1979).
The first of these exceptions is search incident to arrest
This exception was carved out by the court in Chimel v. California,
394 U.S.

752, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969), and later

modified in Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 61 L.Ed.2d 2,
627 (1979).

These decisions give an officer authority to search a

person legally arrested.

The scope of the search extends to the

person and the limited area within the control of the person arrested.
These cases contemplate a search for weapons or evidentiary items
1-1hich the arrested person might con.ceal or destroy.
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If the officers

in this case did not have probable casue to arrest Ronald Kelly,
then arresting him without a warrant was illegal and anything seiz
in a search incident to an illegal arrest is inadmissable.

If t~,

officers did have probable cause to arrest Ronald Kelly and had i
fact arrested him, they only had the right to search his person
and areas within his immediate control, contemporaeously with the
arrest..

Shipley v. California, 394 U.S. 818, 23 L.Ed.2d 732, 89

S.Ct. 2053 (1969).

Mr. Kelly was in

his living room when Office'

Farnsworth informed him that he would "have to" (emphasis added)
come with him to talk to detectives concerning this homicide.

If

this was the point and time of the arrest, the officers had no
legal authority to search other rooms of his house as incident to
his arrest.

They only had the right to search his person and the

area within his control.

Since there were three officers present

at this time, there was no reasonable possibility that he could o'
would conceal or destroy evidence or weapons in other parts of the
house before he w~s placed in the police vehicle outside his
residence.
The second exception to the search warrant requirement for
searches is the "exigent circumstances" exception.

Exigent circuo·

stances are said to exist when immediate police action is required
to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to
forestall the likely escape of a suspect on the threatened removal
or destruction or evidence.

State v. Dorson, 614 P.2d 740 (Ha.

1980); State v. Trijillo, 624 P.2d 44 (N.M. 1981); State v. Turchil
632 P.2d 497 (Ore. App. 1981).
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Once Officer Farnsworth had observed Ronald Kelly in
his shorts, without a weapon, and had entered his residence,no
other exigent circumstances existed for a search.

There was no

longer any reasonable possibility of danger to life, oronerty,
or the destruction of evidence and the exigent circumstances/
hot pursuit exception could not be used to justify a search of
the Defendant's house for physical evidence of the crime the
officers were investigating.
Sometimes the exigent circumstances exceotion is used
to justify a protective sweep of all or oart of a residence
when officers have a reasonable belief that other persons are
present on the premises and that such persons might nose a
danger to officers or might destroy evidence.

A nrerequisite

for such a protective sweep is that police have grounds to
believe that other Potentially dangerous persons are oresent.
If the officers in this case had reasonably believed that other
persons might be present they would certainly have looked for
such persons when they entered the Appellant's residence rather
than waiting until they were about to leave.
In Gagliano v. State, 629 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1981), the
Nevada court held that police officers were not justified in a
warrantless intrusion into another room of an apartment where
a defendant was arrested in order to check for a possible wrong
doer where defendant clad only in underpants was in full view
when the officers entered.
Another exception to the warrant requirement is the
plain view exception.

This exception holds that items which

are in plain view or sight at the time of a oolice interrogation are
-21-

subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence.

Harris

v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1069, 88
S.Ct. 992 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43, 10 L.Ed
2d 726, 743, 83 S.Ct. 1623 (1963); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 446, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971).
The plain view doctrine however requires more than a prior justification for intrusion into an otherwise protected area.
must

There

also be an immediate connection between the object and

criminal activity, to-wit; probable cause.

Plain view seizure

is limited to items that are clearly incriminating.
States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1978).

United

In addition,

the Coolidge, supra case requires that a nlain view discovery
must also be inadvertent.

The defense maintains that the

"discovery" of the Defendant's shoes, pants, and gloves does not
fall within this plain view exception.
In the case of the shoes, Officer Farnsworth did not
have a right to enter the Defendant's bedroom.

If the Apoellant

was not in custody the officer could not legally follow him
around his house.

If the Apnellant was in custody, the

of~icer

could not interrogate him about what he was wearing without
informing him of his Miranda rights and could not use answers
given as a result of an illegal interrogation to gain probable
cause and obtain thereby a plain view observation of the
Appellant's shoes.
pants.

The same would hold true for the Appellant's

They were not clearly incriminating (they were black

and no blood stains on them were observed until after they were
seized and sent to the FBI.)

They only became incriminating
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after the Appellant admitted wearing them that night, an
admission made as a result of custodial interrogation but without a valid waiver of Miranda rights.

On the other hand, if

the officers did not have probable cause to believe Appellant had
committed a crime, they had no probable cause to believe his pants
were evidence of that crime even if the pants were in Plain
view in the bedroom.

The police officer who seized the Appel-

lant's gloves did so during a search for "other persons" in
the Defendant's bathroom.

The Appellant maintains that this

search for "other persons" was merely a subterfuge for an illegal
warrantless search of the Defendant's Premises after he had
been taken into custody.

The discovery of the gloves was not

inadvertent as required by Coolidge, supra, but rather the
result of a search based on the pretext of a protective sweep
which was not reasonably necessary.
item is

merely a pretext to search for something else, the

search may be invalidated.
1981).

If a legal search for one

State v. Lair, 630 P.2d 427 (Wash.

Searching the bathroom and finding gloves while claim-

ing to be looking for a Person is not an inadvertent discovery,
especially in view of the dely in conducting that search and in
view of the fact that the gloves themselves were not obviously
contraband, stolen goods, or objects dangerous in themselves.
Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 472, 29 L.Ed.2d at 537.

The gloves

were located on the bathroom floor and the stains on them were
not apparent until they were illegally seized by the officer.
Thus,none of the items (shoes, gloves, pants) come within the
plain view exception.
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The last exception to the warrant requirement which
might pertain to this case is that of a valid consent to search.
Officer Farnsworth was asked at the Preliminary Hearing of
this case if the Defendant consented to a search of his house
or seizure of anything.
did not (PH 195).

Officer Farnsworth testified that he

The United States Supreme Court has held

that the mere acquiesence to the authority of the police is
not consent and conduct which indicates only acquiesence of
perceived police authority, as in this case, will not sunnort
a search based on consent regardless of the lack of overt
coercion.

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 20 L.Ed.2d

797, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (1968).
Mr. Kelly did not consent to other officers entering
his premises after the entry of Officer Farnsworth.

He did not

consent to having any of his personal property seized.

Even

if the officers had probable cause to search for evidence in
this case, probable cause in itself does not justify a warrantless search.

State v. Spietz, 531 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1975).

The shoes, pants, and gloves seized in this case do not fall
within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.

They

were seized illegally and should not have been admissible at
Mr. Kelly's trial under the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 654-55, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1089-1090, 81 S.Ct. 1684
(1961).
POINT V
STATEMENTS MADE AND EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A
RESULT OF THE VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT'S
FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS MUST BE
SUPPRESSED UNDER THE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS
TREE DOCTRINE .
-24-

\Vithout waiving his Miranda rights, the Appellant was
asked a number of questions including the questions about what
he had been wearing.

Without being informed of his right to

remain silent he answered many of these questions, and indicated a Pair of shoes, a pair of Pants, and a pair of gloves,
all of which the officers illegally seized.

The State sought

to use the answers he gave and the clothing he indicated
against him.

This is specifically what the exclusionary rule

says the State may not do.
The fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine prohibits
the government from using against the accused information derived
from facts learned as a result of the unlawful acts of government agents. Wong Sun v. United States, sunra, 371 U.S. 471, 9
L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963); and Fahy v. Conneticut, 375
U.S. 85, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229 (1963).

After Placing the

Defendant under arrest and taking him to the nolice car the
officers continued to ask him questions without any waiver of
his Miranda rights.
Euen if some of these statements are found to be
voluntary and the product of a waiver of his Miranda rights,
they were.at their root, induced by the APpellant's being confronted with information learned and evidence seized as a
result of the unlawful acts of the police and must be suppressed
under the poisonous tree doctrine,

~·

Items seized pursuant to the search warrants issued
after the Appellant was taken into custody must also be suporessed because the probable cause for issuance of these warrants
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was obtained in violation of the Defendant's Miranda rights
and his Fourth Amendment
seizures.

ri~hts

against illegal searches and

All three search warrants in this case purport to

base the probable cause for their issuance on the shoes of
the Defendant with soles matching the footprints leading frol'l
the scene of the crime, and bearing blood stains,

The soles

were observed only after the shoes were seized, and at the
time of the preparation of the search warrant there had been
no analysis of any clothing to determine if blood existed there.
The Appellant maintains that under no theorv were these shoes
legally observed and seized.

Thus, the evidence seized nur-

suant to search warrants which have as their probable cause
the shoes, and conclusionary officers' statements, must also
be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
supra.
POINT VI
THERE I.JERE NO EXIGENT CIRC~STN!CES TO JUSTIFY
Till: WARRANTLESS SEARCH A.I'm "rnPOUNDME'lT" OF
THE APPELLANT"S RESIDE:lCE AFTER HIS ARREST.
AS A RESULT, THE SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED SEARCH
WARRANTS FOR THAT RESIDENCE, EVEN IF
FOUND TO BE BASED ON LEGALLY-OBTAINED PROBABLE CAUSE, DID NOT CURE THE ORIGINAL ILLEGAL
ENTRY AND IMPOUNDMENT BY "SECURING" OFFICERS
WITH VIDEO EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, ALL EVIDENCE
SEIZED PURSUANT TO THOSE SEARCH WARRANTS MUST
BE SUPPRESSED.
In State v. Dorson, 615 P.2d 740 (Haw. 1980), the
Hawaiian Supreme Court held that "the warrantless securing or
impounding of a house, where otherwise invalid (not based on
exigent circumstances) cannot be validated by the fact that no
comprehensive search was made and no evidence seized until a
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until a search warrant arrived.

The State must show exigent cir-

cumstances existing at the time of entry and impoundment if the
warrantless securing of premises by the police is to be sustained.
Absent such exigent circumstances, the right to search or seize
is to be determined by a judicial officer and not by a policeman.
The Court found that police officers securing premises while
waiting for a search warrant to arrive amounted to a seizure of
the house and its contents.

Likewise in People v. Shuey, 120

Cal.Rptr. 83, 533 P.2d 211 (1975), the California Supreme Court
held that the occupation of a defendant's house by the police
while they were waiting for a search warrant amounted to an
illegal seizure, that securing of premises is itself a seizure
which cannot be validated by a subsequent warrant, because the
property has already been seized.
The Washington Supreme Court made a similar finding in
State v. Bean, 89 Wash. 2d 467, 572 P.2d 1102 (1978).

In that

case the defendant was legally arrested for a narcotics violation
and his vehicle searched.

Based on illegal drugs found in the

defendant's vehicle, the police sought a search warrant for his
residence.

Prior to obtaining the warrant officers who had the

residence under surveillance were ordered to secure the house.
They entered it and observed marijuana in plain view.

The Court

held that the "securing of the house" could not be based on
exigent circumstances even though other persons were present on
the premises and suppressed all evidence obtained from the house
whether it was seized before
served.

o~

after the search warrant was

The Court held that the initial entry into the house was
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wrongful and the subsequently obtained search warrant did not
cure the original illegal entry.

In this case before the Court,

the only legal entry into the residence of 637 Brixen Court was
made by Officer Farnsworth.

There was no consent to the entrv

of Officers Martin and Bernard and no consent to Officer Bernar,l
remaining to secure the premises and admitting technician CoHley
into the premises to video tape the front room and two purses in
the closet

Certainly after Ronald Kelly was removed from the

premises there was no threat of the destruction of evidence and
thus no exigent circumstances for the seizure of his house for
five hours until the first search warrant was served.
POINT VII
POLICE ACTING PURSUA."lT TO A SEARCH WARRANT FOR
BLOOD AND/OR SEMEN STAINED CLOTHING AND A
BLOOD STAINED SHOELACE COULD NOT LEGALLY SEIZE
OTHER ITEMS NOT OBVIOUSLY CONTRABAND , IN STRUMENTALITIES, OR EVIDENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC CRIME
AND ANY SUCH EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SUPPRESSED.
The law requires a nexus between an item to be seized,
criminal behavior, and a place to be searched.

Probable cause

necessary to seize a particular item must be examined in terms
of "cause to believe that the evidence sought will be at the

place to be searched and a particular aporehension or conviction "
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 793, 87 S.Ct.
1642 (1967).

This nexus requirement fulfulls the the Fourth

Amendment requirement of particularity.

Hithout such a require-

ment, police could seize an item on pure speculation.

The lead-

ing Fourth Amendment case dealing with this issue was Coolid1Se v.
New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 202:

-23-

(1971).

In that case, the Supreme Court recognized two histor-

ical reasons for the search warrant's requirement:

1) to elim-

inate searches not based on probable cause and 2) to avoid the
specific evil of the "general warrant"--an exploratory rummaging
in a person's belongings by requiring a particular description
of things to be seized.

403 U.S. at 467, 29 L.Ed.2d at 583.

the Coolidge case also required that the incriminating nature of
articles seized must be immediately apparent.

403 U.S. at 466,

29 L.Ed.2d at 583.
The following cases have involved searches pursuant to
warrants where evidence not named in the warrant was suppressed
because its incriminating nature was not immediately apparent.
In Nunes v. Superior Court, 100 Cal.App. 3d 915 (1980),
the California Appeals Court held that officers could not seize
articles on the general suspicion that they may coincide with
descriptions of stolen property contained in police reports not
in their possession, citing Warden v. Hayden, supra,

The Court

held:
The plain view doctrine does not justify the
seizure pursuant to a search warrant of items
not named in a search warrant which the police
believe matched articles described in police
reports. While officers may seize articles
not named in a warrant which are reasonably
identifiable as contraband, police officers
are foreclosed from seizing items indiscriminately. They must demonstrate that a nexus
exists between the item to be seized and
criminal behavior.
In the case of People v. Murry, 77 Cal.Aon. 3d 305, 143
Cal.Rptr. 502 (1978), officers entered premises pursuant to a
search warrant for narcotics and observed 67 television sets,
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twenty of which had their serial numbers removed.
two of these sets.

They seized

The Court rejected the contention that this

evidence justified seizure under plain view standards, finding
that the television sets were not inherently identifiable as
contraband.

Other cases have had similar holdings.

Corrnnonwealth v. Hawkins, 280 N .E. 2d 665 (Mass. 1972)

See
(government

bonds with name other than occupant's were unconnected with
narcotic crime and police could not seize them momentarily to
ascertain whether or not they had been stolen); Anderson v.
State, 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976)

(with a search warrant for

marijuana, police could not seize slides which when held uo to
the light depicted nude male children); State v. Keefe, 537 P.2d
795 (Wash.App. 1975)

(Officer with search warrant for gun could

not take "i" and "e" letters from a typewriter as "possible"
evidence in a forgery case.)
State v. Shinault, 120 Ariz. 213, 584 P.2d 1204 (Ariz.
App. 1978), held that pursuant to a search warrant for narcotics
and illegal firearms, police could not seize from inside a box
an outwardly innocuous bound columnar pad containing inside

the first names of the defendants and entries referring to "dollar:
and pounds."

The court in that case found that while the officers

had a right to look in the box for narcotics, once they looked and
recognized it contained nothing but papers, the search was no
longer for narcotics and firearms, but rather for written records,
not listed in the search warrant.
In the case before this Court, the officers seized many
items for which they had no authority.
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(See Appendix A)

Specifically, the defense questions the seizure of various
purses, a toilet token, a red nipple stuffed with cotton, a
bed sheet, a bed cover, a blue and white sweater, and "miscellaneous papers" and maintains that the seizure of these items
was illegal.

Even if the officers had a right to look in the

purses for blood and semen-stained clothing, or a blood-stained
shoelace, when they saw that these items were not present, they
had no right to further examine the purses or to seize them.
They had no probable cause that these items were contraband,
merely a suspicion that it was unusual for the Defendant to
have them in his possession as in the cases cited above.
The defense also questions what nexus a toilet token,
a red nipple, a bed cover and sheet, a red scarf with knot, and
a blue and while sweater might have to any specific crime.

The

seizure of the last item mentioned inthe search warrant return,
"miscellaneous papers," is the final proof that these officers
considered themselves to be on a general treasure hunt and not
in anyway bound by the confine of the Fourth Amendment.

This

search took place before May 1, 1982, and, therefore, no inquiry
is necessary into whether these officers abrogated the constitution in good faith.
It must also be pointed out that the wrong address
appears en one of the three search warrants and the correction
had no indication of when or who made such.

(See Appendix A).

It is clear, therefore, that the three search warrants were
based on insufficient, conclusionary language of officers who
did not have sufficient foundational facts to make them.
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Additionally, these search 1varrants were based on illegallyseized articles and gave the magistrate the erroneous impression that these illegally-seized articles were still in the
place to be searched when they had already been taken out of
the house when Appellant was taken to jail.
POINT VIII
THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION DUE TO THE FAILURE TO
HOLD THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION WITHIN 10
DAYS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§77-35-7(c) (1953 AS AME~lDED)
On February 11, 1982, the Information charging Mr. Kelly

was filed and signed by Judge Grant of the Circuit Court.

Mr.

Kelly had been and was in custody at the time of the issuance of
the Information.
On February 12, 1984, the Defendant/Appellant was
arraigned and a Preliminary Hearing was set for March 5, 1982, at
the hour of 9:30 a.m., in front of the Honorable Judge Gibson,
Fifth Circuit Court Judge.

There was no waiver of the time

limits prescribed in §77-35-7(c) by Mr. Kelly.
On March 5, 1982, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the DefendMt
was present, with counsel, prepared to proceed.

The prosecution

was not prepared and, over the Defendant's objection, the Preliminary Hearing was continued to March 24, 1982, at the hour of
9:30 a.rn. in front of Judge Jones, Fifth Circuit Court Judge.
On the afternoon of March 23,

1982, Mr. Kelly's counsel

received, over the telephone, the message that the Preliminary
Hearing had been re-set for April 5, 1982, without the benefit of
any hearing on the matter nor with the consent of either the
State or Mr. Kelly.
-32-

On April 5, 1982, Mr. Kelly, by and through his attorneys
of record, moved to dismiss the Information based unon the violation of Mr. Kelly's rights as expressed in Utah Code Annotated,
§77-35-7(c)

(1953 as amended).

The violation of §77-35-7(c) deprived Mr. Kelly of a substantial statutory and constitutional right, the remedy for which is
dismissal of the Information.

Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-7(c)

states, in pertinent part:
. If the defendant does not waive a
preliminary examination, the magistrate
shall schedule the preliminary examination.
Such examination shall be held within a
reasonable time, but in any event not
later than 30 days if he is not in custody;
provided, however, that these time oeriods
may be extended by the magistrate for good
cause shown . . .
(Emphasis added.)
The statute stated above was obviously violated in Mr.
Kelly's case and such a viol~tion requires dismissal of the Information.

There was no good cause showing by anyone to establish

the basis for the original setting being beyond the 10-day limit.
Further, there was absolutely no showing for the unacceotable delay
between March 24 and April 5, 1982.

There was, indeed, no hearing

so that such a showing could be attemoted.
The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting a closely aligned
statute concerning 90-day disposition requests stated the issue was
one of jurisdiction.

See State v. Moore, 521 P.2d 556 (1974).

The

Utah Supreme Court went on to state that an Information, filed too
late, deprived the courts of the jurisdictions to hear such a
complaint, and that the devise, atternoted to be used by the prosecution, of dismissing the complaint and filing a new complaint could
not be used and was a violation of the 90-day detainer statute.
-33-

Mr. Kelly's position is that the time limits expressed in
§77-35-7(c) are jurisdictional in nature and if the Circuit Court
violates those time limits, absent "good cause" or a showing of
good cause and hearing ordered to question such cause, the court
looses jurisdiction of the case created by that Information, and
the Information must, therefore, be dismissed.
In the case of Morton v. Supreme Court, 411 P.2d 170
(1966 Arizona), the Arizona Supreme Court granted Mr. Morton's
request for dismissal based upon the fact that the Defendant's
speedy trial rights (i.e., trial within 60 days) were violated.
The Arizona Court was viewing their case in light of the delay in
trial and the statute which allows only sixty days in which to
try a defendant.

The language of Rule 236 of the Arizona statute

is almost identical to our §77-35-7(c) which aoplies to preliminarv
hearings.

The Arizona Court stated:
It does not seem that constitutional
and statutory rights of a person charged with
crime should be made dependent upon the amount
of business in the court or the number of jury
cases at issue.
If so, what would be good
cause for delay would mean one thing in those
counties with little litigation and another
thing in those where the litigation requires
the frequent attendance of trial juries.
In
Hernandez v. State [40 Ariz. 200, 11 P.2d 356]
we held that the . . . personal comfort and
convenience of the court and jury should not
be permitted to nullify the laws passed for
the protection of accused oersons.
If the
delay in bringing on the trial is not attributable to ~me act of accused, the statute is
imperative in its provisions, and the court
has no alternative but to dismiss the prosecution.
P.2d at 966.

See also Reason v. Sheriff of Clark Countv, 579 P. 2d 781 (1978 Neva'
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The Information filed against Mr. Kelly must be dismissed
due to the statutory and constitutional rights violated by the unreasonable and unexplained delay of Mr. Kelly's right to a Preliminary Hearing within 10 days of his arraignment in Circuit Court.
ilr. Kelly was in custody on February 10, 1982, and remains so to
this day.

There was no good cause shown for any of the delays

involved in getting Mr. Kelly to Preliminary Hearing and, therefore,
based upon the case law and statutory requirements this Information should have been dismissed.
POINT IX
IT WAS ERROR NOT TO GRANT THE APPELLANT'S
TIMELY MOTION TO DISMISS THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES ALLEGED AGAINST APPELLA_f\JT.
On

February 10, 1982, Mr. Kelly was arrested for the death

of Carla Taylor.

At the autopsy, "some hairs from the right

buttock," (T. 342) of the victim were located and retrieved by the
pathologists assigned to the case.

Of the hairs thereon located,

the law enforcement agency involved sent all of those hairs for
testing to the FBI in Washington D.C.

These hairs were anlayzed by

the FBI, along with one known sample from Mr. Kelly's pubic area
obtained by search warrant.
Mr. Malan, of the FBI testified at the Preliminary Hearing
that subsequent to his anaylsis of "one hair" found on the buttocks
of the victim and the known sample of pubic hair taken from
Kelly:

This pubic hair microscopically matches the
the pubic hair of Mr. Kelly. Therefore, this
particular pubic hair either originated from
Mr. Kelly . . . to havec:ome from anybody
else but Mr. Kelly, it would have to be a
person of the negroid race.
(PH. 529)
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~r.

Mr. Malan went on to state his opinion that one of the hairs
collected form the "right buttocks" of the victim was from Mr.
Kelly or someone who exhibited the same characteristics of Mr.
Kelly's hair (T. 529).
The vaginal area of the victim was described by the
medical examiner, Dr. Ryser, as follows:
Q:

Dr. Ryser, you say you can't rule out rave?

A:

That is right, I can't

Q:

Even though there's no semen or seminal
fluid found in the vagina?
A: That's right.

Q:

Even though there was no bruising around
the opening to the vagina? I'm sure there's
a medical name for that, but I'm not familar
with it.

A:

That's right.

There was no such bruising.

Q:

You can't, however, rule our the nossibility
that there was no rape; correct?

A:

I can't rule that out either.

Q:

You can't say one way or the other, can you?

A:
I can't
(T. 348)

There was no evidence of any forced sexual assault, seminal fluid,
sperm, or foreign pubic hairs on victim's pubic region (T.351), nor
whether the bruised regions hanpened before or after death (T. 353)
Indeed, the prosecutor asked the pathologist whether or not a
forced sexual assault could occur but leave no visible marks or
injuries on the body (T. 347).
Such a question was asked based upon the absence of
factual substantiation for the aggravating circumstances alleged in
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this homicide case.

After an entire reading of the trial trans-

cript, it is clear that there was insufficient evidence to convict
r!r. Kelly of a homicide alleging special circumstances of "raoe,
Jnd/or aggravated sexual assault."
It is the position of the Appellant that the existence of
one pubic hair, described to be similar to Mr. Kelly's on the right
buttocks of the victim, along with two other hairs not associated
<Jith Mr. Kelly is insufficient as a matter of law and fact, to substantiate the aggravating circumstance of attempted rape, rape,
and/or aggravated sexual assault.
There was a toothbrush inserted in the vagina but as this
court is well aware, in Utah, there was at the time of this offense
no rape by device, nor is the charge of forcible sexual abuse one
of the numerated aggravating circumstances under Utah Code Annotated
§76-5-202 (a)- (h) (1953 as amended).
No Appellant, including Mr. Kelly, should be held to stand
trial on a death penalty case, made so by the use of alleged aggravating circumstances, unless those circumstances have relevant evidence that is substantial and of such a convincing quality that it
could support a conclusion by reasonable minds that the Defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mr. Kelly respectfully maintains that the trial court
erred as a matter of applicable law and fact in finding him guilty
of the First Degree Homicide with the aggravating circumstances of
attempted rape, rape, and/or aggravated sexual assault.

That the

amount and quality of evidence pertaining to the alleged aggravating
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circumstances (i.e., one pubic hair on right buttocks) was and is
totally insufficient to sustain said aggravating circumstances.
and that, therefore, such circumstances should have been
(T. 586, 704).

dismisse~

See Jaramillo v. State, 517 P.2d 490 (Hvo.

1974).

POINT X
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
OF FIRST DEGREE HOMICIDE, A CAPITAL OFFENSE
In State v. Petree, 659 P. 2d 442 (1983), this Court stated
notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's
decision this Court still has the right to review the sufficiencv
of the evidence to support the verdict."

Further, the Court noted,

"We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when
the evidence (seen in the light most favorable to the verdict) is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted."

(citations omitteC•

Finally, the dissent in State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 299 (1980) noted,
"If the circumstances essential for conviction are ambiguous and
consistent with the innocence of the accused,

then this Court must

hold, as a matter of law, that there is no substantial evidence to
support the guilt of the accused."

Id. at 234-5.

Viewed against this background, the evidence to support
the conviction for First Degree Homicide, a Capital Offense is foun:
to be lacking.
At trial, the evidence indicated that the victim was

kill~

in her apartment while her two children slept in the back bedroom
(T. 100).

That the victim's apartment had three entrances, two of
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which were locked at the time of the homicide (T.223-224).

The

one entrance leading not into a common hallway but directly into
the apartment of Jerome Thorton was locked only from Mr. Thorton's
apartment and could not be locked from the victim's apartment
(T.223-224, 307).

Jerome Thorton, the black neighbor of the

victim, was at hol'le the evening of the homicide.

The officers

talked to him during the early morning hours of February 10, 1982,
(T. 306).

Mr. Thorton had been in the victil'l 's apartment and

has also been extremely angry with her due to the fact that she
had called the police on him when he had been physically abusing
his former live-in roomate, Darla Cates (T.153, 225, 304).
It was further learned that Jerome Thorton had not
answered the door when the Appellant had attemnted to use his
phone to call a taxi in the early morning hours of February 10,
1982.

Also, Jerome Thorton was a convicted felon who had been

convicted, among other offenses, of aggravated assault on a
female with a tire iron (T.310).

It was also learned that no

request for blood, pubic hair, or fingerprints was ever obtained
from Mr. Thorton (T.312).
The only factor which connected the Appellant, Mr. Kelly,
with the crime was his presence there that morning.
Thorton was there as well..

But Jerome

Appellant had blood on his pants'

cuff that was "consistent" with the victim's blood, but also
consistent with twelve million other people's blood (T.473-474).
It was never shown that the Appellant had a reason to dislike

the victim, but Mr. Thorton was shown to have an extreme dislike
for her (T .225).
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The pubic hair found on the buttocks of the victim that
was found to be consistent with Appellant's was never analyzed
against the pubic hair of Mr. Thorton.

It was later shown,

through defense expert Dr. Birkley, that a person need not
even be in the place a hair is found since others can transfer
such hair through a process commonly called static electricity
or attachment to a foreign host (T.643-646).
Based on consideration of all the facts of this case,
and the standards of review expressed above, the Appellant
feels there was insufficient evidence to convict him of First
Degree Criminal Homicide, a Capital Offense.
There is also an extreme deficiency in proof that even
if the Appellant had been proven to knowingly and intentionally
have killed the victim, that such was done "while the actor was
engaged in the commission of, or attempting to commit rape, and/
or aggravated sexual assault."
The prosecution chose to charge Appellant with two acts
(killing and raping) which were alleged to have occurred at the
same time.

There is no evidence within the voluminous records

on appeal to which the State can point that has, in any way,
proven the concurrent acts alleged in the Information against
Appellant.

There was, indeed, a killing; and there may have

been an attempted rape, and/or aggravated sexual assault, but
there is no evidence whatsoever that the killing took place
"while," a rape or aggravated sexual assault was taking place.
It is highly likely that the toothbrush was inserted after
death.

Indeed, the prosecutor argued that the death took place
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because the Appellant was enraged at being denied sex, which
was shear speculation since no witnesses existed and no nhysical
evidence on, or in, the body in the apartment would, or in fact
did, substantiate such a claim.
Due to this single glaring deficiency, the aggravating
circumstances should have been dismissed by the trial court.
This error, added to the substantial nature of the facts argued
above makes the decision inescapable that, at most, the Court
could only consider Second Degree Homicide, a First Degree
Felony, as a possible verdict against him.

There was, we

respectfully submit, insufficient evidence to convict Apoellant
of any offense due to the nature and quantum of evidence presented by the prosecution at trial.
CONCLUSION
The case charged against Appellant, Ronald Lemoyne Kelly,
was serious, but the errors described above were substantial.
Due to those errors the Appellant resnectfully requests that the
case against him be dismissed, or in the alternative, that the
case be remanded for a new trial as, at most, a Second Degree

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
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DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84114, this

day of
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